A. Introduction
The leaks about the Tempora 1 and Prism 2 programmes, conducted by the UK and US government respectively, sparked a public outcry 3 that resumed the 'security vs. privacy' debate 4 and underlined the importance of the fundamental rights 5 to (informational) privacy and data protection to democracy. 6 Surprisingly, however, the potential for policy discussions deriving from the (albeit scant) information on the technology used to perpetrate surveillance was not fully harnessed. Tempora allows "the GCHQ (…) to tap into and store huge volumes of data drawn from fibre-optic [transatlantic] cables for up to 30 days so that it can be sifted and analysed" 7 for information relevant to "security, terror, organised crime…and economic well-being". 8 The National Security Agency (hereafter NSA)'s Xkeyscore allows "realtime interception of an individual's Internet activity", 9 e.g. based on "name, telephone number, IP address, keywords". These accounts hint at the use of deep packet inspection (hereafter DPI), even when the target is traffic data, or data stored by private companies, 10 since Internet Service Providers (Internet access providers, hereafter ISPs) "could reroute the traffic through an encrypted IPsec VPN installed to enable security agencies to have direct access to the [email messages] sent there." 11 The first policy inference that can be drawn is that PRISM and Tempora are old wine in new bottles. Last year, the UK government proposed a programme compelling ISPs to give security services real-time access to Internet usage data collected through DPI. 12 In 2006, it emerged that the NSA was stealthily wiretapping all traffic passing through a major AT&T switching facility using the Narus Semantic Analyser, a DPI engine. 13 The surreptitious cooperation between the NSA and Google has been suspected for some years. 14 The second, and crucial, policy inference is that using DPI to sieve the cyberspace for deviant behaviour represents a contradictory and reckless approach to the policy goal of 'cybersecurity'. Moreover, cybersecurity and the safeguard of the privacy and personal data of citizens are inextricably interlinked.
This article looks into such overlooked policy lessons, 15 providing an appraisal, from a EU legal perspective, of the uses of DPI for preventive policing. It does so by first shedding light on the complex scenario of cybersecurity from a legal perspective, which highlights the relation between cybersecurity and the protection of personal data vis-àvis the policing of deviance. It then reviews the legality of security-related uses of DPI, 16 and appraises them against the issues raised in terms of cybersecurity and data protection.
B. The law of cybersecurity: a patchwork of data protection, telecom and NIS laws
In the EU, cybersecurity is informally defined as the protection of the cyber domain, consisting in preserving "the availability and integrity of the networks and infrastructure and the confidentiality of the information contained therein." 17 The 'cyber domain' can be seen as comprising four building blocks, which are targeted by law in a piecemeal fashion.
I. The networks
The physical networks are made of communication channels (physical cables, radio waves etc.) and routers. The law protects them as critical information infrastructure (CII): fundamental resources and services whose intentional or accidental collapse could seriously endanger the functioning of society. 18 The many ISPs 19 that manage the subnet-network and information system": 31 i) availability (services are operational as expected); ii) authenticity (users' claimed identity can be established); iii), integrity (transmitted/ stored data are unchanged and complete); and iv) confidentiality (unauthorized parties cannot intercept communications/read stored data). The seminal judgment of the Bundesverfassungsgericht 32 makes the well-rooted 33 interconnection between computing, data protection and informational privacy, explicit.
The applicable instruments both require adopting technical tools to block the packets before they jeopardize information security canons, and attempt to thwart the economic incentives to cybercrime. 34 In this sense, they are preventive: if packets do not infect terminal equipment, the threat is avoided.
IV. The end-point terminal equipment and users
According to the end-to-end principle, communication channels are 'dumb' links connecting 'clever' machines or terminal equipment (e.g. routers, PCs, mobile devices, sensors, RFID-enabled objects, etc.). 'Cleverness' means making the data transmitted intelligible, and this is why the machines are both the targets and the instruments used to perpetrate attacks. A fifth building block of the cyber domain could be humans, who ultimately control the devices: they are behind communications, the adoption of security and the perpetration of crimes. Indeed, the law targets the consequence of humans' actions and behaviours.
V. The problem of network security
The myriad devices connected to the Internet underscores its value. 35 Unfortunately, calculating the cost of the insecurity of the networks is hindered by technical complexity. A proxy is the rough calculation of the cost of cyberspace crimes, 36 which appears sufficiently high to justify a reactive, rather than preventive approach. 37 In the EU, cybercrime informally "refers to (…) different criminal activities where computers and information systems are involved either as a primary tool or as a primary target." 38 Wall's 'Internet test' 39 helps distinguishing between different types of cyberspace crimes, which is crucial to appraise the impact of the uses of DPI on data pro-tection, privacy and NIS. Some offences are proper cyberspace crimes, in that they would not exist without the Internet. They are the crimes against the data, the logical highway, and the machine, the failure of cybersecurity that result from harming the information security canons. Investigating such failures clashes against the conundrum of attribution: the difficulty in tracing the machine initiating a crime, and the individual behind it. 40 The revised Directive on Attacks against Information Systems, 41 and articles 2-6 of the Convention on Cybercrime (hereafter the Convention), 42 criminalize the following: illegal access (hacking); illegal interception (breach of confidentiality); system interference (denial of service attacks, spam); data interference (malware); and misuse of devices (production and sale of harmful software and devices). The Convention, and the policy discourse, cover also offences that exist before and outside the Internet: data revealing lawbreaking information, material covered by copyright and intellectual property, material offending morals, such as expressions of hatred, and child pornography.
***
Setting aside the problem of attribution, the Convention lays down common rules for investigating all types of crimes (beyond those listed) occurring in cyberspace, and urges the adoption of tools enabling to intercept and access information. Existing tools, often stemming from the private sector, permit to detect and block the packets so that the offensive content is not spread further, and support investigation for both types of crimes. These include 43 live interception of data through DPI, analysed in the following in its applied uses 44 from a legal and NIS perspective.
C. DPI: features and uses
DPI is a technology, placed in routers, empowering ISPs to screen 'live' all packet layers (including the payload, i.e. content) sent over the networks, thus challenging the end-toend principle. Mueller defines DPI an "enabling technology", 45 in that its functioning depends on the applications or modules installed: recognition, notification and manipulation. Recognition uses data mining algorithms to analyse, on-and offline, any parts Bendrath / Mueller 2010; Del Sesto / Frankel 2008; Berners-Lee 2009; Bendrath 2009; Daly,2010; Ohm 2008. of the packets at any layer of the Internet architecture against specific patterns or features (keywords contained in a predefined library), and compares the obtained data on the basis of such patterns and keywords. Notification consists in sending alerts in relation to the patterns and keywords identified, and is usually conducted offline. DPI engines combining recognition and notification are called 'passive'. Manipulation, or 'active' DPI, affects the destination of the packets and can be performed both on-and offline. DPI evolved from shallow and meso-packet inspection tools, and started being distributed a decade ago to detect and prevent malware 46 , which is of obvious import for cybersecurity. Yet, its potential for eavesdropping was soon apparent: DPI seemed suitable to fulfil the legal requirements of the US Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), whereby all ISPs must install any available technologies enabling lawful wiretapping. 47 Either with a view to recover the investment, 48 or pushed by 'Google envy', 49 companies started using it for lucrative services such as ad-injection (the evolution of behavioural advertising 50 ) and 'network management' 51 (traffic prioritization). In turn, organizations interested in the protection of digital rights lobbied for its use, and it was soon apparent that DPI could be used for policing the networks from all sorts of content deemed unlawful: material offending the (culture-sensitive) definition of morals 52 , such as pornography; the expression of hatred; child pornography; or material consisting in (regime-sensitive) subversive speech. In other words, DPI represented a new and powerful means for old ends. 53
Appraising the uses of DPI for 'security' purposes from a legal perspective: the test of privacy and data protection
The packets screened by DPI carry data produced in the course of "personal Internet usage" 54 and communications (e.g. e-mails or Voice over Internet Protocol, VOIP), which contain information susceptible to identifying an individual. Hence, their collection represents an intrusion into the right to personal data protection. 55 Moreover, "personal Internet usage" and communications fall within the broad definition of correspondence ("communication" in the language of the EUCFR), 56 an attribute of the right to D. 46 privacy (to be interpreted in line with the case law relating to article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights 57 , hereafter ECHR). The monitoring of information produced in the course of correspondence, including traffic and location data, 58 constitutes an interference with the right to private life irrespective of whether the correspondence is private. 59 Furthermore, individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy if there is no warning about the monitoring of 'correspondence'. 60 Since DPI is susceptible of intruding into the rights to privacy and data protection, its uses are only admissible if they fully comply with a test for permissible limitations. 61 First, the intrusion must be "in accordance with the law" or "provided for by the law": 62 there must be a domestic legal basis respecting set standards of quality. 63 Second, intrusions must respect the essence of the rights to privacy and data protection. This is a contentious matter in legal scholarship, and current studies are exploring methodologies; 64 a possible approach is to look at rights in terms of their attributes and carry out a legal assessment accordingly. 65 Third, intrusions must be necessary in a democratic society, which implies that "the interference corresponds to a pressing social need and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued" 66 (subject to states' margin of appreciation). Legitimate aims in the EU are either the objectives of general interests enshrined in article 3 of the Treaty on the European Union, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of other. These include serious crime and the protection of national security.
Article 21 of the Cybercrime Convention contains a legal basis potentially allowing the use of DPI: states can enable 'service providers', for the sake of serious offences, to conduct real-time (confidential) interception ('collection or recording') of content data, relating to specified communications transmitted by means of a computer system.
Ad-injection, copyright infringement and network management do not have any security import, and they would thus not pass one or more parts of the permissible limi-tations test, as compellingly demonstrated elsewhere. 67 In the following, the reasoning is applied to malware and spam detection, content control and eavesdropping.
I. Malware and spam
Both malware and spam are cybercrimes and serious offences. Malware is considered 'illegal data interference', 68 which compromises the integrity, availability and confidentiality of data stored in the terminal equipment of both single and multiple users, or devices (when servers or unprotected cloud data centres are infected). Depending on the device attacked, malware can affect CII, 69 industrial secrets, and obviously users' rights to data protection and confidentiality of communications. Spam is prohibited by the Eprivacy Directive 70 and constitutes illegal system interference 71 affecting the availability of systems, which is a legal interest of operators and users.
The E-privacy and Framework Directives 72 oblige electronic communications services and network providers to employ suitable technical and procedural means to ensure the security of the network and the services issued therein. These instruments thus offer a preliminary legal basis for the adoption of malware-oriented DPI, as recognized by the EDPS, 73 and the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party 74 (in the context of email services).
Since malware-oriented DPI can block threats before they spread, it both prevents crime and protects personal data and the confidentiality of communications. These are legitimate aims that allow an interference with both the right to private life and data protection; 75 moreover, the interference aims at better protecting the restricted rights. This use would thus be permissible, with some qualifications expressed in the conclusions.
II. Child pornography as an example of content control
Child pornography is a discomforting topic, as it concerns the most vulnerable members of society, and the citizens of the future. Unsurprisingly, it is an emotionally charged, and at times biased, subject. This makes it an imperative case study of content control, because protection of children is a legitimate aim necessary in a democratic society. The '. WP 118', Brussels, (2006 . 75 Niemietz v. Germany, at § 36. subject has been widely studied elsewhere, 76 and here I only focus on the permissibility of DPI in relation to it.
Child pornography does not concern cybersecurity; rather, it is a horrific activity and a business pursued by organized crime online. 77 It is considered an offence by both the Convention 78 and the anti-Child Abuse Directive, 79 and subsumes three meanings: a) pseudo child pornography, i.e. images portraying seemingly underage adults (18+) in pornographic poses; b) synthetic child pornography, i.e. the manipulation of pictures of children to simulate scenes of abuse; c) real child pornography, that is the portrayal of an act of abuse on a child.
DPI is said to be a very useful tool to uncover cases of child abuse and pornography and take down rings of (gainful) abusers. Buttressing such claims is fundamental for assessing the proportionality of the measure, but in order to appraise permissibility, I should start with legality. To date, there is no legal basis authorizing the use of DPI engines for the detection of child pornography. The anti-Child Abuse Directive provides a legal basis for blocking and taking down content akin to child pornography, 80 but it does not lay down rules (on methods) for detecting pornographic material. The recent trend in drafting memoranda of understanding between police services and private actors with a view to "identifying and removing known child pornography material" and "increasing as much as possible the volume of system data examined," 81 offers an invalid solution. Memoranda of understanding do not have the force of law. The legal basis authorizing the use of DPI engines for the detection of child pornography must be adopted at the EU level, as not to do so would hinder the competitive development of the internal market. 82 Moreover, requiring service providers to run DPI engines would infringe the prohibition of general monitoring laid down by the e-Commerce Directive, 83 whereby member states must not oblige ISPs "to monitor the information which they transmit or store, nor a general obligation actively to seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity", as reminded by the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Scarlet extended and Netlog cases. 84 Hence, the use of DPI in case of investigations relating to child pornography is currently impermissible. Yet, should such a legal basis be introduced, it would be likely to pass the proportionality test only in the case of real pornography. 85 It should also be noted that DPI could do nothing to prevent abuse per se, but simply block the circulation 76 of pictures, and, in an unknown percentage of cases, lead to identification and prosecution of perpetrators. This raises serious issues of public policy and proportionality, as addressed in the conclusion.
Eavesdropping for serious crime and national security
The Tempora and PRISM programmes offer a clear example of the use of DPI 86 engines to tackle national security and serious crime at large, such as terrorism 87 and all threats, unrelated to NIS, posed by 'deviant behaviour'. The Convention 88 allows extending the scope of application of real-time interception of content data 89 to "Other criminal offences committed by means of a computer system, and the collection of evidence in electronic form of a criminal offence," such as 'online terrorism'. Existing legal provisions either allow wiretapping specific individuals, or mandate the retention of telecoms data for the purposes of investigating serious crime. Not only the Data Retention Directive 90 does prohibit retaining content data, which violates the confidentiality of communications, but also it mandates that "data retained in accordance with this Directive are provided only to the competent national authorities in specific cases and in accordance with national law". 91 The reasoning behind the inadmissibility of DPI for child pornography applies, mutatis mutandis, to eavesdropping and fishing expeditions. National provisions should stem directly from -currently absent -EU provisions, which should solve the conundrum of the prohibition of general monitoring by ISPs first. 92 Hence, using DPI engines for fishing expeditions is impermissible as it lacks a legal basis and infringes existing applicable law.
E. Appraising the uses of DPI from a cybersecurity perspective
According to its informal definition, cybersecurity does not aim at policing the Internet from traditional deviance, but at preserving the classical information security canons. Generic online (passive or active) unauthorized DPI could amount to illegal interception, 93 i.e. the loss of confidentiality of personal data. Active DPI could also amount to system interference, 94 
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Maria Grazia Porcedda · Lessons from PRISM and Tempora 382 THEMEN system. Running DPI could thus constitute state-corporate crime, namely "Illegal or socially injurious actions that occur when one or more institutions of political governance pursue a goal in direct co-operation with one or more institutions of economic production and distribution". 95 Moreover, the short-term advantages for serious crime investigation would severely affect NIS and the rights to privacy and data protection. Landau wrote that the security risks would dwarf the enormous privacy ones. 96 In fact, there would be little incentives to protect the collected information, which could be exploited by both insiders (due to the appeal of big data) 97 and malicious outsiders. After the 2006 AT&T scandal, it emerged that the Narus DPI engine could be configured, once sold, as the users saw fit. 98 Infamously, in the 'Athens Affair' CALEA-compliant software sold by Ericsson to Vodafone Greece was used to intercept the government's communications for almost a year before the 2004 Olympic Games. 99 The case of malware-oriented DPI is different. Since its final aim is to achieve higher information security, its use should be encouraged, 100 provided it is controlled and audited. In fact, private companies may sell DPI as a malware solution and then use it for other purposes, 101 in particular since their business model and the interest of law enforcement officers tend to meet online. 102
Lessons from PRISM and Tempora: avoiding societal collateral damage and cybersecurity risks
The outcome of the analysis of the legal permissibility of DPI (based on its potential intrusion into the rights to privacy and data protection), and the impact on cybersecurity understood as NIS allows drawing some meaningful conclusions.
The use of spam-and malware-oriented DPI is both permissible and welcome: the intrusion into the two rights is geared to safeguard them, as well as NIS. However, a specific provision concerning DPI's use for malware and spam detection should be adopted to ensure the proportionality (engines should focus on viruses only 103 ) and transparency of the tool, and enabling appropriate scrutiny. The use of DPI for content control and eavesdropping is currently impermissible, as it both lacks a legal basis, thus violating the rights to privacy and data protection, and imperils cybersecurity.
Endangering NIS for the sake of short-term investigative advantages is contradictory in two ways. First, because cybersecurity is regarded as a crucial national security matter. The use of DPI engines is not the only example of contradiction 104 : the use of statesponsored malware is another case in point (e.g. the 'Magic Lantern' and the Bundestrojaner). 105 Second, because affecting the confidentiality of communications exposes to the danger of 'societal collateral damage': harming the very rights and privileges that characterise our democracy 106 and that we cherish.
The European Court of Human Rights acknowledged that a "system of secret surveillance for the protection of national security poses the risk of undermining or even destroying democracy on the ground of defending it." 107 DPI can be used only if auditable and subject to strict (judicial) control, which is difficult as ISPs run the engines. Moreover, asking ISPs to run DPI engines constitutes a form of 'tilting', 108 whereby private actors would perform the role of police services, amassing detailed profiles of citizens without being submitted to the same judicial scrutiny: "DPI is a letter carrier who reads all your mail, listens to all your calls, follows you as you browse downtown and in the mall, notes your purchases, listens in as you ask questions of the research librarian, and watches over your shoulder as you read the daily paper -and then correlates the information in real time." 109 "The Stasi could only dream of such data." 110 The ECtHR established that proportionality has to be judged on a case-by-case basis, in relation to the aim pursued. 111 What aim can justify the cooperation of private and state actors for the destruction of the basis of democracy? The reply is none, for the adults of today, and for those of tomorrow. 
